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Can electoral systems determine how particularistic spending is distributed in developing 
countries? The ways in which legislators seek benefits for their constituencies, have been the 
subject of longstanding debate in political science. While the discussion has broadly focused 
on the theoretical consequences of electoral systems on legislators’ behaviour, little evidence 
has accounted for these alleged effects, especially in developing country settings. This paper 
focuses on particularistic spending in Honduras, providing a natural experiment to test 
different relevant hypotheses found in the literature. Since the early 1980s Honduras used a 
closed-list ballot with single-member and plurinominal districts electoral system. In 2004 
the country moved to an open ballot structure keeping the same range of district magnitude. 
On the basis of original data from the Honduran Social Investment Fund, a battery of 
statistical tests is conducted. It is expected that under a closed-list system social spending per 
capita will increase as district magnitude shrinks, and the opposite will happen when an 
open-list system is in use. The evidence suggests that the change from a closed-list to an 
open-list system causes an increase in spending per capita. However, the interaction of type 
of ballot with district magnitude does not produce the results predicted by influential 
theories.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 Introduction 
 
The specific causes of the manner in which legislators seek particularistic benefits for 
their constituencies, activities framed as pork barrel politics (Ferejohn 1974, 
Lancaster 1986), have been the subject of longstanding debate in the political science 
literature. While the discussion has broadly focused on the theoretical effects of 
electoral systems on legislators’ constituency service behaviour, few empirical 
analyses that account for these supposed effects have been made, especially in 
developing country settings. Studies analyzing the effect of electoral systems on the 
behaviour of legislators frequently suffer from major deficiencies. For instance, large-
N studies while being quite useful to identify regularities across countries, are not 
suited to tracing the causal paths linking dependent and independent variables. On the 
other hand, very often well regarded case studies that evaluate the impact of open-
ballot structures actually hold constant the electoral systems aspect. 
Key theoretical contributions on the field of electoral systems and legislators’ 
behaviour make the assumption that legislators base their work in office with the re-
election goal in mind. In this regard, it is usually assumed that once in office 
legislators will adapt their behaviour to strategies that maximize their chance to 
achieve that goal. Since electoral systems are the frames that determine the formal 
rules in which candidates compete for votes that secure them seats, determined 
electoral system types are expected to generate specific strategies to obtain votes 
(Katz 1980, Carey, Shugart 1995, Cox 1987).  The literature distinguishes between 
two types of electoral systems, systems that generate incentives to look for a personal 
vote and systems that encourage a party vote (Hicken, Simmons 2008). As defined by 
Cain, Ferejohn et al. the ‘personal vote’ is the “portion of a candidate’s electoral 
support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and 
record” (1987, p.9), while the ‘party vote’ is the type of vote which is motivated by 
non-candidate attributes such as ethnicity, or reactions to contemporary national 
economic and social issues and conditions. 
Much of the discussion has focused on the incentives for intraparty competition that 
would be generated by the resulting electoral system of the interaction between type 
of ballot and district magnitude and its effects on intraparty competition (Carey, 
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Shugart 1995). Systems where party leaders do not control the candidate selection, 
such as the proportional representation (PR) with open ballots, will stimulate 
candidates to differentiate their electoral offer from their co-partisans. On this basis, 
candidates will have more incentives to attract personal votes instead of party votes. 
The incentives are higher as the district magnitude increases, since there are more 
candidates to compete against. Whereas the effect is the opposite when party leaders 
control the candidate nominations; namely, under a closed-list PR system. In this case, 
Carey and Shugart (1995) argue that candidates have more chances to be individually 
identified by voters the smaller the constituency; therefore have more potential to look 
for a personal vote. Incumbent legislators can use their resources available to compete 
for votes under different electoral systems frameworks, for example through pork 
barrel strategies.  
Despite of the debate generated in the academic community regarding the alleged 
effects of ‘personal votes’ and ‘party votes’ electoral systems over legislators’ 
behaviour, the evidence found is sometimes contradictory and yet not conclusive. 
Honduras is an excellent case study to test these theories. This Central American 
country since the early 1980s used a closed-list ballot structure with single-member 
and plurinominal districts electoral system. In 2004 it moved to an open ballot 
structure keeping the same range of district magnitude. As far as I am concerned no 
one has assessed the empirical effects of this type of change.  
In this paper I focus on particularistic spending at the Honduran Social Investment 
Fund (FHIS) as my dependent variable. This is a public institution, dependent on the 
Executive, created in 1990 to tackle poverty all over the Honduran territory. I use 
spending per capita, per municipality, per year, between 1990 and 2009, at FHIS as 
my unit of analysis. I find that the change from a closed-list to an open-list system 
causes an increase in spending per capita. However, the interaction of type of ballot 
with district magnitude does not produce the results predicted by the theory. Other 
political variables have explanatory potential as it will be analyzed in this paper. 
This paper is organized in seven sections. In the first part I examine the relevant 
literature on pork barrel politics and electoral systems. In section two I set the 
hypotheses of this analysis. Part three introduces the case study of Honduras, followed 
by a detailed description of the data used in this study. Sections five and six present 
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the results of a set of statistical models with a corresponding robustness analysis. I 
finish this paper with some conclusions. 
Electoral systems, intraparty competition and pork barrel 
politics 
 
The factors that shape the distribution of particularistic spending; i.e. the provision of 
goods and services with funds that come from a common pool resource, to benefit an 
exclusive set of recipients (Carey 1996, p.103), is one of the puzzles mostly studied in 
the political science literature. An important part of the academic debate has focused 
on the role that electoral systems have creating incentives on legislators to appeal to 
pork barrel strategies. This is a type of constituency service in which legislators seek 
to secure particularistic spending for the constituencies they represent. Based on the 
assumption that legislators seek re-election, Lancaster (1986) triggered a discussion 
stating a relationship between district magnitude and legislators’ behaviour. Basically, 
incumbent legislators have more incentives to allocate pork barrel projects in their 
constituencies under single-member district electoral systems, while in multi-member 
district systems the incentives tend to diminish. In a single-member constituency, the 
possibilities that voters bond a project with their legislator are greater. Whereas in a 
multi-member constituency voters “cannot easily determine who is actually 
responsible, if anyone, for obtaining a project” (Lancaster 1986, p.70). 
 
Carey and Shugart (1995) agree with Lancaster (1986) in that single-member 
constituencies (plurality electoral systems) generate incentives in individual 
legislators to seek pork projects as a credit claiming strategy. However, they argue 
that in proportional representation (PR) systems, the forms of incentives available are 
dependent on intra-party competition. This in turn depends on the interaction between 
district magnitude (M) and the type of ballot. In closed list-PR systems voters vote for 
party lists and the allocation of candidates in electable positions depends ultimately on 
the party leadership. Thus, an incumbent legislator will have in theory reasons to be 
accountable to her party leaders. In an open list-PR electoral system voters vote for 
candidates and, all else equal, every candidate has the same probability to get a seat. 
In this case, candidates will have more incentives to try to differentiate themselves 
from their co-partisans, looking for votes based on personal votes, i.e. votes based on 
the candidate’s individual attributes rather than their parties’ characteristics (Cain, 
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Ferejohn et al. 1987). Consequently, legislators will have a different source of 
motivation to look for pork barrel projects for their constituencies and claim credit for 
them. 
 
Carey and Shugart (1995) hypothesize that under closed list-PR systems intraparty 
competition will increase as M approaches one seat. While when an open-list PR 
system is being used the larger the district magnitude the larger will be the intraparty 
competition. Holding other factors constant, one should be able to observe the same 
pattern in particularistic spending distribution. The interaction effect just described 
between district magnitude and type of ballot is depicted in Shugart (2005), see Figure 
1 bellow. 
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Figure 1. The differential effect of district magnitude on the intraparty dimension 
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Source: Shugart (2005, p. 47). 
Discussion around the effects of district magnitude and intraparty competition 
 
Since its publication, Carey and Shugart’s (1995) argument has been subject of 
increasing scrutiny. Surprisingly, very few empirical analyses have been conducted to 
quantitatively asses the influence of district magnitude and type of ballot over 
particularistic spending. In all, scepticism among scholars surrounds most of the 
findings and theoretical claims. As Grofman and Fraenkel claim, much of the 
scepticism comes from the potential explanation of different factors against the 
electoral systems’ explanations and the potential bias introduced in cross-national 
studies. Positive correlations between a certain type of electoral system sometimes 
can be interpreted by the sceptical as a form of “selection bias connected to variations 
in cultural patterns and economic development that cannot be fully addressed with 
only cross-sectional data” (2008, pp. 75-6).  
Furthermore, Carey and Shugart’s (1995) proposal has been challenged in theoretical 
grounds. Crisp et al. (2007) contend in Carey and Shugart’s model that M compounds 
both, the competition between candidates from different parties for a seat and the 
intraparty competition. Thus, for Crisp et al. (2007) the attention on the incentives to 
build a personal reputation and look for a personal vote is lost when using M as an 
indicator of intraparty competition. In this regard, they argue that challengers and 
incumbent candidates from the same party not necessarily take into consideration the 
Open-list PR 
Closed-list PR 
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number of seats available (i.e. M) when making decisions whether they choose to look 
for a personal vote or a party vote. Instead, they might consider other factors such as 
the number of seats their party is likely to win based on each party’s past electoral 
experience.  
 
Moreover, the re-election assumption, in which the explanatory potential of electoral 
systems over legislators’ behaviour is mostly based, is often contended. Despite of the 
evidence supporting the argument that parliamentarians seek their re-election as a 
major goal, especially in developed country settings (Mayhew 2007 [1974], Cox, 
McCubbins 2007), Carey (1996) has found that legislators have other incentives for 
pork-barrel politics rather than staying in office for another term. In this regard, the 
possibility to attain a top hierarchical position in the public sector, for example as a 
minister or ambassador, motivates legislators to seek votes for their parties through 
constituency service in the constituencies where they have been elected, even when 
the system does not allow their re-election. In a similar vein, as Samuels (1999) points 
out, the internal party organization can be determinant in creating different career 
incentives for legislators, who balance which strategies gives them more revenues 
taking into consideration their own political and economic resources and those 
controlled by the party leaders. 
 
As Strøm (1997) points out, besides the re-election goal legislators have more 
incentives to base their work, which makes the puzzle more difficult to solve. 
According to this scholar:  
 
When a parliamentarian chooses to focus his energies on constituent case work, 
for example, we first seek an explanation of that behaviour in his goals and in the 
constraints that political institutions place on his behaviour and opportunities.  
 
The political institutions that most powerfully enable and constrain 
parliamentarians are those that regulate their attainment of ballot access, re-
election, party office and legislative office (1997, p.163).  
 
Ballot access is consistent with the electoral system explanation proposed by Carey 
and Shugart (1995). However, other theoretical contributions note that whether people 
vote for parties or for candidates, does not necessarily determine if a legislator will 
focus his work on the constituency or the party. Instead, legislators seeking re-election 
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must render accounts of their work to different principals that could be their 
constituents, their party leaders, the president of the country or even the local 
authorities (Carey 2007, Carey 2009). But party office and legislative office are 
determined by the organization of the party and the legislative branch as well as their 
internal procedures; in this regard, as Strøm (1997) points out, the possible 
combinations of different forms of organization and internal procedures are broad, so 
are the difficulties to measure them.  
 
Alternative explanations to pork-barrel politics 
 
Apart from the discussion that has revolved around the effects of electoral systems on 
intraparty competition and its consequences for pork barrel politics, other 
explanations that account for pork barrel behaviour have been developed. These 
contributions can be classified in two groups. On the one hand, some scholars 
concentrate in the type of constituencies governments focus to allocate resources. 
Basically, whether in electoral terms it is a government stronghold, an opposition 
stronghold or a constituency where the party in government is dominant in most 
elections. On the other hand, others discuss the degree of economic and cultural 
development of a country and its implications in the political system.  
 
Cox and McCubbins (1986) put forward a model of electoral competition aimed to 
explain the distribution of projects allocation. They consider the existence of three 
types of groups a legislator who is seeking re-election must address: (1) supporters —
the reelection constituency in Fenno’s (1978) terms—, (2) opposition —those who 
have consistently opposed him— and (3) swing groups —those who have not 
consistently supported him or have been hostile—. In this context, it is not clear to 
what group politicians will target pork-barrel spending. From Cox and McCubbins’ 
perspective rational politicians will promise “benefits to those groups in their 
constituencies with the highest rates of return, and promise no or even negative 
benefits (i.e., costs) to those with the lowest rates of return” (1986, pp. 375-6). They 
conclude that candidates take into consideration the risk of losing their electoral 
constituency if they do not provide benefits to their voters. Therefore, their prediction 
is that risk-averse politicians will tend to over-invest in their closest supporters. 
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On the contrary, Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) argue that candidates have good 
reasons to appeal to swing voters. They assume that is reasonable for politicians to 
aim to obtain as much votes as possible so they can secure a minimum number of 
votes necessary to gain a seat. It may be possible that electoral constituencies are not 
enough to secure that minimum threshold. Furthermore, more loyal voters are 
expected in electoral constituencies that base their vote on ideologies or positions 
rather than the benefits they can get from politicians.  
McGillivray (2004) takes some of the ideas of Cox and McCubbins (1986) and 
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) adding institutional variables. She argues that the 
decision to target re-election constituencies or swing voters depends on the party 
system and the form of government. She establishes two basic types of party systems: 
weak party systems and strong party systems. The combination of party strength with 
electoral rules should give four different empirical combinations (1) strong-party 
majoritarian systems, (2) strong-party PR systems, (3) weak-party majoritarian 
systems, and (4) weak-party PR systems. Nonetheless, she focuses on the first three 
types because for her there is a relative indeterminacy of the predictions of weak-party 
PR systems (McGillivray 2004, p. 40).  
Golden and Picci (2008) take McGillivray’s (2004) argument and build a model of 
pork-barrel politics in contexts of open-list PR (weak party systems in McGillivray’s 
terminology). For Golden and Picci (2008) what determines pork barrel in open list-
PR systems is the degree of leadership of a legislator. According to their predictions, 
pork-barrel spending will tend to be concentrated in those electoral districts with 
strong leadership of legislators. To support their argument they analyse a panel data 
set of infrastructure spending in post-war Italy from 1953 to 1994 when it was used an 
open-list PR rule. To measure the legislators’ level of leadership they take different 
proxies such as level of literacy of the MPs, positions of higher office within their 
parties, and whether legislators have held previous ministerial positions. Those 
proxies are aggregated and correlated at the constituency level. They find that the 
constituencies that show strong leadership of legislators from the governing party are 
more successful securing infrastructure investments. Whilst the effect is the opposite 
in constituencies with strong leadership from legislators of opposition parties. 
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Finally, another group of theories focuses on the levels of economic and cultural 
development to explain different patterns of political behaviour. This is especially the 
case of developing country settings where old political traditions contend with newer 
formal institutions (Norris 2004). Informal institutions might have an even stronger 
influence than the electoral rules on politicians’ decisions and the outcomes of those 
decisions (Helmke, Levitsky 2006). Taylor Robinson (2006) argues that the high 
levels of poverty combined with verticalism of the political parties in countries like 
Honduras, create a clientelistic relationship between parties and voters. In this regard, 
despite of the incentives electoral institutions have in theory over legislators to appeal 
to personal reputations or party reputations, candidates and parties work together to 
gain votes from masses of voters who in exchange expect to get favours from the 
party in government. 
To conclude, it has been observed that the puzzle is complex and the theoretical 
discussion broad. Important empirical contributions compare systems where people 
vote for candidates and for parties, such as the mixed electoral systems natural 
experiments, e.g. Germany (Stratmann, Baur 2002, Sieberer 2010). Others hold 
constant the electoral rules factor contrasting it with theoretical predictions, for 
instance the open list-PR system in Brazil (Samuels 1999, Lyne 2008). In general, few 
empirical analyses have been made testing the hypotheses on electoral systems and 
pork barrel politics. This is especially the case in developing country settings. Most 
important, Honduras is a unique case of natural experiment where the electoral system 
changes from a closed list-PR to an open list-PR while holding the district magnitude 
constant. This gives a broad range of variation within the country, giving the 
possibility to control for other explanatory variables of pork barrel.  
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Hypotheses 
 
Following Carey and Shugart’s (1995) model, in this paper I aim to test the following 
two main hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Under an open list-PR electoral system, pork barrel spending will 
increase proportionally as district magnitude enlarges. 
Hypothesis 2. Under a closed list-PR electoral system pork barrel spending will 
decrease proportionally as district magnitude enlarges. 
An alternative hypothesis comes from the fact that spending at the Honduran Social 
Investment Fund should be, according to its constitutive law, directed to the poorest 
regions in the Honduran territory.  
Hypothesis 3. Pork barrel spending will tend to be allocated in municipalities in 
proportion to their levels of poverty. 
I also test hypotheses related to whether spending will go to supporters, party in 
government’s dominant municipalities1 or opposition municipalities. 
Hypothesis 4. Social spending per capita will be directed to government supporters 
regardless of the type of electoral system. 
Hypothesis 5. Social spending per capita will be directed to the party in government’s 
dominant municipalities regardless of the type of electoral system. 
Hypothesis 6. Social spending per capita will be directed to opposition municipalities 
regardless of the type of electoral system. 
The case of Honduras 
 
The formation of a National Constituent Assembly in 1980 is considered the start of a 
civilian rule in Honduras (Bulmer Thomas 1990, Barahona 2005). This popularly 
elected Assembly enacted a new constitution which, with some minor changes, has 
                                                 
1
 I define ‘party in government’s dominant municipalities’ as those municipalities where the party in 
government has won the plurality of votes in most but not all of the presidential elections. 
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ruled the country since 1982. The same constitutional body discussed and approved an 
electoral law in 1981 which remained in force until 2004, when it was substituted for 
a new electoral law. Each of these two electoral regulations represents two different 
models of political organization, which are directly related with the form deputies are 
elected. Basically, the electoral system used in the elections between 1981 and 2001 
was characterized by having a closed-list system combined with two single and 
sixteen multi-member electoral districts. This meant a direct control of party leaders 
over who would run for elections and the positions of candidates on the party list. 
While the electoral system established in 2004 uses an open ballot structure with open 
endorsement, keeping the same district magnitude structure. Table 1 summarizes the 
characteristics of the electoral systems that have been used in Honduras between 1981 
and 2009 and the elections where they have been applied. 
Table 1. Elections for Congress in Honduras and ruling Electoral System, 1981 to 2009 
 
Year of election Ballot structure Electoral 
formula used in 
PR districts 
Number of 
seats 
District 
magnitude 
range1/ 
1981 Closed-list (Fused) Method Hare with 
largest remainders 
82 1 – 14 
1985 Closed-list (Fused) Method Hare with 
largest remainders 
134 1 – 25 
1989 Closed-list (Fused) Method Hare with 
largest remainders 
128 1 – 23  
1993 Closed-list (Fused) Method Hare with 
largest remainders 
128 1 – 23  
1997 Closed-list 
(Separate) 
Method Hare with 
largest remainders 
128 1 – 23  
2001 Closed-list 
(Separate) 
Method Hare with 
largest remainders 
128 1 – 23  
2005 Open ballot with 
open endorsement 
Method Hare with 
largest remainders 
128 1 – 23  
2009 Open ballot with 
open endorsement 
Method Hare with 
largest remainders 
128 1 – 23  
1/ The range of seats per constituency. In Honduras there are 2 single-member constituencies and 16 
multi-member constituencies that since 1989 range from 2 to 23 seats. 
Sources: Honduran Electoral Law of 1982, Honduran Electoral Law of 2004, Paz-Aguilar 2008. 
 
The closed-list electoral system (elections 1981 – 2001) 
 
During this period Honduras used a closed-list ballot structure, time during which 
political parties had to present a list of candidates for deputy positions. Primary 
elections were held at least since 1985, but their results were not binding for political 
parties. In practice, major parties would held the elections but the final endorsement 
of candidates was negotiated between the leader of the winning faction and the other 
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contending party factions (Taylor-Robinson 1996). Until 1997 it was used a fused 
method of elections; under this system voters casted one single vote for president and 
deputies.2 The method of fused votes was used until the 1997 elections, and then 
ballots for president, party lists of deputies and lists of municipality representatives 
were separated.3 To convert votes into seats in proportional systems it was used the 
Hare method with largest remainders.  
The open ballot with open endorsement electoral system (elections 2005 – 2009)  
 
This method was introduced in 2004 and used for the first time in the 2005 elections. 
The first distinction that has to be made is that under this system every party has to 
hold primary elections. Internal movements are formed and compete in the primary 
elections.4 Compared to the previous model, parties cannot alter the resulting list of 
candidates to the legislature.5 Both, primary and general elections, use the open ballot 
with open endorsement structure. This modification in the ballot implies derivative 
changes in the electoral formula. In this system voters can cast as many votes as there 
are seats available in a constituency. For example, Francisco Morazán is the largest 
constituency with 23 deputy positions. In this case voters can mark up to 23 
candidates from the different lists parties present. Every mark counts as a vote for a 
candidate. After the election, every party list will be sorted from the most voted to the 
least voted candidate. The total of votes of every party list are added and then divided 
by the number of seats under competition in that constituency to get a quota of votes. 
When a party reaches that quota gains a seat. That seat is given to the most voted 
candidate in the party list. And the same procedure is repeated until no party can reach 
the quota. When this happens, if there are still seats available these will be assigned 
following the largest remainders method. 
                                                 
2
 Before 1993 the fused elections included the municipality positions, i.e. voters casted a single vote for 
president, deputies and members of their municipalities. 
3
 One could expect a stronger party leadership effect on legislators’ decisions under this system. 
4
 Factions present a list of candidates for president and vice-president, legislators’ seats, and major and 
vice-major seats. In case that there is no more than one faction competing for elections, parties can 
avoid the primary election requisite. Large parties for the period studied have held primary elections. 
Small parties did not hold them.  
5
 This implies that the final list that is going compete in the general elections is formed by candidates 
from different factions. 
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The political context 
 
Honduras is a presidential political system. The president is the head of the executive 
and is directly elected every four years. Re-election of the president is not allowed in 
this country. The legislative body is composed of one chamber of 128 seats divided in 
18 constituencies called departments. Deputies are elected for a period of four years 
with the possibility to compete for re-election indefinite times. The party system has 
been dominated by two political parties, the Partido Liberal de Honduras (PL) and the 
Partido Nacional de Honduras (PN). The first was founded in 1891 and the latter, an 
excision of the PL, created in 1902. Both parties were linked in their origins to 
American banana producer companies and to the oligarchic interests of their 
members.  
During the twentieth century Honduras goes through a series of institutional 
disruptions. Military rule with very brief periods of elected governments characterizes 
the time frame of 1933 to 1980. Elections to form a constitutional assembly were held 
in April of 1980. The following year general elections were organized and the new 
Congress set up in January 1982. Between 1981 and 2009 eight general elections have 
been held. During general elections five different elective positions are disputed: (1) 
President of the Republic, (2) three Presidential Delegates, (3) deputies to the 
Congress and their substitutes,6 (4) deputies to the Central American Parliament, (5) 
and municipality mayors. The combination of these five types of elections the same 
day makes more likely for candidates to the legislature to be more dependent with the 
presidential candidate during campaign. 
Since 1981 the PL has won 5 presidential elections and the PN 3. Since 1997 they 
have alternated in power. Using the effective number of parties index (ENP index, see  
Laakso, Taagepera 1979), the party system in Honduras can be classified as a two 
party system. The two dominant parties share seats in Congress with three small 
parties, Innovación y Unidad (PINU), of centre-left ideology; Partido Demócrata 
Cristiano (PDCH), of centre-right ideology, and Partido de la Unificación 
Democrática (PUD), of leftist ideology (Norsworthy, Barry 1994). As observed in 
                                                 
6
 Each legislator has his or her substitute in Honduras. The role of deputy substitutes is to replace the 
permanent deputy in her absence.  
 14 
Table 2 the PL has won five out of eight presidential elections in 28 years of 
democratic rule. The other three elections were won by the PN.7  
Table 2. Presidential Election Results and Parliament Composition in Honduras 
(1981-2005) 
 
Election 
year 
PL PN PINU PDCH UD a/ Total valid 
votes 
Voters 
turnout 
(%) 
ENP 
Index 
1981 
Seats in 
Congress 
636,392* 
44 
491,089 
34 
29,419 
3 
19,163 
1 
- 1,178,044 22.0 2.17 
1985 
Seats in 
Congress 
786,594* 
67 
701,406 
63 
23,705 
2 
30,173 
2 
- 1,543,863 16.0 2.12 
1989 
Seats in 
Congress 
776,983 
55 
917,168* 
71 
33,952 
2 
25,453 
0 
- 1,755,545 23.4 2.03 
1993 
Seats in 
Congress 
906,793* 
71 
735,123 
55 
48,471 
2 
20,350 
0 
- 1,712,730 64.97 
 
2.03 
1997 
Seats in 
Congress 
1,040,343* 
67 
846,220 
54 
 
41,409 
5 
 
24,909 
1 
 
24,288 
1 
 
1,977,169 27.65 2.20 
2001 
Seats in 
Congress 
964,590 
55 
1,137,734* 
61 
31,666 
4 
21,089 
3 
24,102 
5 
2,179,181 33.73 2.42 
2005 
Seats in 
Congress 
918,669* 
62 
850,005 
54 
18,764 
3 
25,808 
4 
27,802 
5 
1,841,048 55.08 
 
2.41 
2009 
Seats in 
Congress 
817,524 
45 
1,213,695* 
71 
39,960 
5 
38,413 
4 
36,420 
3 
817,524 
 
N.A 3.12 
a/
 This party formed in 1992 and participated until 1997.  
* Signifies the party that won the presidency. 
Sources: Taylor-Robinson (1996, p.329) updated with information from the Electoral Supreme Court of 
Honduras.  
 
Clientelism  
Given the poor living standards of most of the Honduran population, good 
connections in government seem to be necessary to have access to even the most basic 
public services. This rule applies mostly to the Liberal Party and the National Party 
due to the two-party system nature of the Honduran polity. Evidence of clientelism 
relies most of the time on observation and interviews. Yet, an analysis of survey data 
concludes that party activism increases inversely to the standard of living conditions 
(Booth and Aubone 2007, cited in Taylor-Robinson 2010, p.117). Taylor-Robinson 
                                                 
7
 The Electoral Law of 1982 and the one of 2004 allow independent candidacies; however, no 
independent candidate has won a seat in Congress.  
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(1996, 2010), supports this conclusion with observational data. She interprets that 
Honduran politicians tend to reward activists’ loyalty once in office; however, the 
latter need to provide evidence that they have supported the party in government and 
the candidate during the elections. Even if the party loses the election, loyalty can be 
rewarded the next time the party holds office. A party militant can express secretly her 
dissatisfaction with a party or a candidate in the ballot box and still receive returns for 
her activism during the electoral campaign. Nonetheless, for Taylor-Robinson (2010) 
the costs of defection can be shared in the community in the form of loss of pork-
barrel projects, depending on how large is the total share of party defection: 
A frustrated partisan could protest by privately defecting from their party in the 
voting booth. If the traditional party still won the election, the defector then 
would still have access to party-channeled government largesse. But the 
traditional party would not be punished effectively unless many voters in the 
community acted in the same faction, and then, if the party still won the national 
election, it would punish the community by not providing it with state funds. 
Small precincts of about 350 registered voters help local party leaders to keep an 
eye on the behavior of purported party supporters (Taylor-Robinson 2010, 
p.117). 
 
One may argue that the existence of a clientelistic political culture in Honduras can 
hinder the effects of electoral systems. However, on the one hand, there is little 
quantifiable evidence that supports the clientelism argument against the electoral 
systems argument. On the other hand, while there is some level of understanding of 
legislators’ clientelistic practices to benefit individuals, there is a lack of knowledge 
of what shapes the allocation of particularistic benefits for a community. 
Data 
For this analysis I use data on social investment projects managed by the Honduran 
Social Investment Fund (FHIS). This is an institution created in 1990 with the 
objective of mitigating the effects of the structural adjustment programmes, which had 
been recently introduced (Heinrich, Lopez 2009, Banegas-Lazo 2009, FHIS 2005). 
According to its constitutive law, its main objective is to promote the improvement of 
the living conditions of marginalized social groups in rural and urban areas. To this 
purpose FHIS provides funding for programmes and projects of social development 
aiming to increase the productivity, employment levels and income of those groups 
(Congreso Nacional 1990). Since its creation this institution’s main source of finance 
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has been the international aid provided in the form of donations or loans, with very 
low interest rates, meant to promote development. Institutions such as the World 
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, KfW Bankengruppe and the European 
Commission are among its main collaborators, which also include other individual 
countries. Besides international funding, FHIS also gets national budget transfers and 
helps to execute projects from other ministries in Honduras.  
 
This institution manages small infrastructure and social projects, such as construction 
of classrooms for small schools, improvement of drinking water systems, small roads 
maintenance and gender workshops. Most of the projects are formulated and 
presented at FHIS by the potential beneficiaries, through their municipalities of 
through registered boards of neighbours. Usually, when the project is funded with 
international sources donors and lenders prioritize which municipalities FHIS must 
intervene in.  
 
The data base of projects used for this analysis was facilitated by FHIS itself. The data 
have been organized by the source of funding, which facilitates identifying whether 
the project is funded with national sources, or with international sources or a 
combination of both. As international funding requires more supervision by 
international donors, it is expected that nationally funded projects will be more 
sensitive to pork barrel activities by Honduran deputies.8  
 
A total of 22,765 projects have been approved at FHIS between 1990 and 2009, the 
majority in education, municipal development and energy areas. The present analysis 
is based on these approved projects. That a project is approved means that it is going 
to be executed. Projects are approved by an internal commission at FHIS, composed 
by the General Director, and the directors of the executive units that form the 
institution. They assign the amounts to be executed in each project. Table 3 presents 
the descriptive statistics for all of the approved projects between 1990 and 2009 in the 
different categories projects have been classified by FHIS, in constant prices 
                                                 
8
 Projects that are funded with national and international sources have been classified as international 
for the purpose of this study.  
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lempiras.9 It is observed that the majority of projects are funded with international 
sources and their management is centralized at FHIS. Moreover, most spending falls 
in the category of education projects, followed by municipal, health and water 
projects.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of approved projects at FHIS by classification of the 
projects 
Category Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total 22,765 342,520.20 892,515.50 0.00 77,700,000.00 
International 17,884 378,272.20 793,938.70 0.00 35,400,000.00 
National 4,873 211,177.90 1,177,359.00 0.00 77,700,000.00 
Centralized 21,340 346,423.00 915,739.90 0.00 77,700,000.00 
Decentralized 1,425 284,072.70 405,192.70 2,257.05 4,470,106.00 
Education 11,946 295,313.90 325,504.90 0.00 12,200,000.00 
Municipal 2,937 386,401.70 511,032.10 0.00 7,797,247.00 
Health 1,870 366,827.30 301,163.10 3,785.09 4,541,216.00 
Water 1,653 810,782.90 2,059,146.00 0.00 35,400,000.00 
Employment 1,143 55,899.42 124,290.50 211.06 3,056,744.00 
Social assistance 804 332,596.30 297,009.50 0.00 3,959,651.00 
Procurement of 
goods and services 
310 626,274.10 4,558,062.00 501.15 77,700,000.00 
Productive 202 140,882.40 300,179.20 20,410.45 1,805,951.00 
Environment 126 659,506.40 863,410.90 1,308.62 7,636,598.00 
Energy 99 906,141.90 1,166,380.00 36,764.61 7,878,194.00 
Informal 71 2,270,005.00 2,070,795.00 20,591.24 12,000,000.00 
Social infrastructure 20 288,555.20 80,270.53 147,686.90 483,990.50 
Multi-sector 12 23,208.71 20,532.59 4,415.94 79,384.13 
Others 1,572 136,558.40 787,772.60 389.95 18,300,000.00 
 
The unit of analysis of this study is the spending per capita at FHIS, in constant 
lempiras, per municipality, per year.10 Considering our interest on the effects of 
district magnitude (M) on spending, Figure 2 show the variation on the means of the 
distribution of spending per capita by M during the 20 years considered in this study. 
The bars to the left include funding from national sources only. The bars to the right 
represent the general spending, which is the combination of spending per capita 
funded with international and national sources. When the combined figures are 
considered (bars to the right), spending per capita tends to be directed to single-
member constituencies (over 230 lempiras per capita). Where district magnitude is 
                                                 
9
 Lempiras (Lps) is the Honduran currency. During recent years, exchange rates have kept around 
US$1 = 18 Lps in average. Real prices are calculated using the formula RS = totaprov / (CPI/100), 
where RS stands for real spending per capita at FHIS. CPI is the consumer price index, divided by 100, 
which is used as a deflator (Abel, Bernanke et al. 2008, p.48). 
10
 To get the per capita figures I divided each observation’s amount by the population size of the 
municipality as reported in the census of 2001. 
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low or medium (between 2 and 9 seats), except for Atlántida in the North Coast, the 
other constituencies have a mean between 50 and 150 lempiras of spending per capita. 
The observable disparities in spending distribution in high magnitude districts (20 and 
23 seats) can be attributed to the fact that the constituency with 20 legislators, Cortés, 
historically has showed higher levels of economic development than; thus one might 
expect lower levels of social investment in this department. In terms of nationally 
funded projects, the most noticeable difference is that in comparison to projects that 
receive international funding, single-member constituencies receive proportionally 
less money.  
 
Figure 2. Means of national and aggregate spending per capita at FHIS, by district 
magnitude 
 
 
 
Figure 3 presents the data with interactive effects to observe whether the type of ballot 
in use affects the funding outcomes. In terms of nationally funded projects, it can be 
noticed that at the time the open-list electoral system is implemented, the amounts of 
spending per capita are larger than under the closed-list system period. As a matter of 
fact it is after the hurricane Mitch hit Honduras, in October 2008, that spending per 
capita increases exponentially at FHIS. To control for outliers in national spending, I 
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drop observations before 1999 in the robustness section; before this year the data is 
more spread out for projects that use this particular type of funding. The influence of 
hurricane Mitch can also be correlated with increases in spending and its geographic 
distribution in terms of projects that are financed with international development 
funds. In all, from simple visual observation it is not possible to identify significant 
differences that might be correlated with district magnitude and type of ballot.  
 
Figure 3. Means of national and aggregate spending per capita at FHIS, by district 
magnitude and type of ballot 
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In general, the data is highly skewed making difficult to obtain good linear estimators. 
To make the data linear I transformed them to their logarithmic form. The main 
explanatory factor of the model consists of the interactive effect between ‘type of 
ballot’ (TB) and ‘district magnitude’ (M). TB takes a value of 0 for a closed-list 
system and 1 for an open-list system. M holds constant during the period of study 
(Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. District magnitude variation across constituencies 
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I control for additional political explanatory factors. I include a dummy for ‘electoral 
year’ (1 for electoral years and 0 otherwise) and ‘new government’ (1 for the first year 
of government and 0 otherwise) to control for electoral and partisan cycles. The 
variable ‘party in government’ takes the value of 0 for the years the National Party 
holds office and 1 for those years of Liberal Party rule. I also include controls for 
government’s electoral strongholds and opposition’s electoral strongholds. To 
construct these two variables I identified in which municipalities the PL and the PN 
have won a plurality of votes in the presidential elections, from 1981 to 2005. If a 
party won in a same municipality all of the seven elections hold during that period, I 
classified that municipality as a stronghold of that party. Once I identified the PL’s 
electoral strongholds and the PN’s electoral strongholds municipalities, I created a set 
of two dummy variables, ‘Stronghold’, which equals 1 if the municipality is an 
electoral stronghold of the party in government and 0 if it is not, and ‘Opposition’ 
which takes the value of 1 if the municipality is an electoral stronghold of the main 
opposition party.  
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Similarly, I also incorporate a dummy to identify the municipalities where the party in 
government won the plurality of votes in the last presidential election. I use this as a 
proxy of swing voters municipalities to asses whether spending will go to strongholds, 
opposition or swing voters. I label this variable as ‘Lost’. ‘Government mayors’ is a 
variable that identifies the municipalities where the party in government holds the 
mayoralty according to the last municipal election. Finally, ‘Turnout’ is the 
percentage of voter’s turnout in a municipality during the last election.  
 
To assess the influence of variation in poverty across constituencies, I include the 
percentage of population living under extreme poverty in each municipality, 
according to the Census of 2001.11 In addition, I control for the percentage of the 
population of the municipality relative to the total population of the country. The 
assumption behind this indicator is that spending will be directed to those places with 
more population density. Considering that increases of social spending at FHIS may 
be due to improvements in the economy of the country, I incorporate a control for 
‘gross development product’ (GDP) in constant prices. However, this variable only 
shows variation in time but its effect at the constituency level cannot be examined. 
For this reason I employ the measure of income per capita per municipality (‘Income 
pc’) as calculated by the Office of the United Nations Development Programme in 
Honduras.12 I include a dummy to control for the effect of hurricane Mitch. In the 
following months after this natural dissaster, occurred in October 1998, the amounts 
of international development aid increased substantially. Finally, I add a lagged 
dependent variable to observe whether there is serial correlation in the way spending 
is assigned over time. 
 
Estimation strategy 
 
The data form an unbalanced panel of 298 municipalities and 20 years, between 1990 
and 2009. The total number of observations is 4,300. I use pooled regressions and 
interactive effects between closed-list and open-list electoral systems, using random 
effects estimating models. Random effects models, as well as fixed effects models, are 
                                                 
11
 The National Statistics Institute of Honduras (INE) uses the unsatisfied basic needs method to 
determine poverty (Instituto Nacional de Estadística de Honduras (INE) 2002).   
12
 These data are obtained from the annual home surveys conducted by INE. 
 22 
used for statistical inference when the data presents variation in time and across units. 
This approach provides more information over the same topic, compared as it was 
treated using an ordinary least squares model or a time series model helping to deal 
with the omitted variables problem these common methods have (Wooldridge 2002).  
 
I choose random effects as the estimation strategy for the present analysis because one 
of the key explanatory factors of this study, district magnitude, is constant over time. 
The fixed effects method does not distinguish the effects of time-invariant observables 
from time-constant unobservables (Wooldridge 2002, p.266). Random effects, on the 
other hand, assume that the variation within each cross-sectional unit is not correlated 
with the regressor, but is part of the error term. However, if there is serial correlation 
in the systematic component of the independent variable, including that outcome as 
part of the error term will result in biased estimations. In such circumstances, using 
fixed effects models is recommended. To control for this potential source of bias I 
include fixed-effects estimator models in the robustness analysis section. In Table 4 
the expected signs of the estimated coefficients are presented.  
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Table 4. Expected signs of estimated coefficients 
 
Variable Expected sign in coefficient 
Type of ballot (TB) + 
M (Log of district magnitude) + for single member districts 
+ for multimember districts if TB = 1 
- for multimember districts if TB = 0 
New government +/- 
Electoral year + 
Party in government +/-  
Stronghold + 
Lost +/- 
Opposition - 
Party in government’s mayoralties + 
Log of Gini coefficient - 
Log of GDP + 
Index of urbanization - 
Percent of extreme poor + 
Percent of population +/- 
Number of schools in the municipality + 
 
Results  
 
Table 6 presents the results of panel data estimations, using random effects, over the 
logarithmic forms of spending funded with national sources and spending funded with 
the aggregate of national and international sources. It most be borne in mind that 
spending with national sources of funding represents 13 percent of the total aggregate 
figure during the period of study. The assumption is that projects funded with national 
sources are prone to be manipulated by politicians. This is because, on the one hand, 
deputies discuss the budget of FHIS at Congress, which opens opportunities for them 
to include the municipalities of their interest in the annual prioritization of the 
institution. On the other hand, this type of funds do not have the restrictions usually 
imposed by international aid agencies, which makes more likely for politicians to try 
to influence the project allocation decisions directly at FHIS’ offices (Castillo 2010).  
 
I test models of pooled random-effects regressions and compare them with interactive 
effects models to observe the influence of TB. For interaction effects models, if 
Hypothesis 1 holds, the sign of the estimated coefficient of M should be negative 
when the closed-list system was in use. If Hypothesis 2 is confirmed then M should 
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have a positive sign for the open-list system. All the results being reported in this 
section are models of robust-standard errors. 
 
For this analysis I use the logarithmic form of district magnitude. Due to the fact that 
Honduras has two single-member constituencies I added 1 to district magnitude (M + 
1), to avoid having logs of value zero that can void the estimations. The results are 
presented in Table 5. 
 
As it can be observed, both, TB and the log of M, are statistically significant for 
nationally funded and generally funded projects in pooled models. The change in TB 
is statistically significant as noted in models 1 and 4. An increase in both types of 
spending is substantially correlated with a systematic improvement of the Honduran 
national accounts; nonetheless, after controlling for this factor the effect of TB is still 
significant.13 When studying the ‘National’ models only, the interaction effect of type 
of ballot produces significant results in coefficients of district magnitude under the 
closed-list system. Under the open-list system M is not significant. Moreover, its 
negative sign contradicts the hypothesis that spending tends to increase in proportion 
to district magnitude. The results are significant in all the ‘Aggregate’ models, 
however, it is difficult to establish a political bias in the geographic allocation of 
projects when international funding is involved. 
 
It is interesting to that none of the variables testing the hypotheses related to which 
municipalities will be benefited by the government were significant (see 
‘Strongholds’ and ‘Opposition’). However, the sign of their coefficients suggest that 
municipalities where the government is electorally dominant are more likely to 
receive funding, whilst the opposition’s strongholds will probably receive less. 
Further evidence to support this result comes from the analysis of spending to the 
municipalities ruled by the party in government, variable ‘Government’s mayors’. As 
observed in Model 1, its coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level and in Model 
3 at five percent level. ‘Lost’ is a variable that distinguishes those municipalities 
where the government lost the immediate last presidential elections. As explained 
                                                 
13
 The negative sign for the Log of GDP in all but Model 3 (projects funded with national sources 
during the Open-list electoral system), can be explained from the fact that international aid funds have 
decreased since early 2000; while the Honduran economy has improved during the same period, 
improving at the same time the Government’s revenues (see graphs 6 and 7 in the Appendix). 
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earlier, I am using this variable as a proxy for swing voters as discussed in the 
relevant literature (Cox, McCubbins 1986, Lindbeck, Weibull 1987, Dixit, Londregan 
1996). The results suggest that the government tend to benefit those constituencies 
where it lost support in the last election, contrary to the supposition of Taylor-
Robinson (2010, p.117) who argues that the Honduran government will punish 
collectively non-loyal voters with less pork-barrel spending.  
 
Other political controls suggest that allocation of funding is sensitive to political 
cycles (‘electoral year’ and ‘new government’), especially in the ‘Aggregate’ figures. 
In addition, whether the party in government is the Liberal Party or the National Party 
seems to determine the proportion of spending per capita in each municipality. In 
other words, when the Liberal Party is in government spending tends to increase. It is 
interesting to note that under the open-list electoral system when the Liberal Party was 
in government spending tended to decrease, the results are not only significant but 
substantial. Some might think that this could be a specific feature of the Liberal 
government of President Manuel Zelaya (2006-2009). However, a more detailed 
exploration (not reported in this paper) shows that during the period of government of 
President Ricardo Maduro (2002-2005), of the National Party, during the months in 
which it operated under the open-list system (years 2004 and 2005) the direction of 
the geographic allocation of funding changed contrary to the previous years. This 
might be interpreted as a sign that the electoral system affected in different ways the 
dynamics of spending allocation under two different parties in government. 
 
Voters’ turnout is significant in all except for Model 3. The effects of this parameter 
are even stronger in models where international aid is involved. Its negative sign 
suggests that spending tends to be allocated in municipalities where voters tend to 
attend in higher proportions to the ballot booth. The interpretation of this result needs 
a bit of discussion. As explained above, interestingly, in Honduras the level of 
electoral abstentionism is lower amongst poor voters. Some interpret this behaviour as 
a sign of clientelism in Honduras; in other words, politicians tend to benefit through 
pork-barrel and other clientelistic practices poorer regions in order to gain votes in the 
next election (Taylor-Robinson 2010, Coleman, Argueta et al. 2009, Cruz, Argueta et 
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al. 2007).14 Thus, voters’ turnout and poverty might be endogenous. That would 
explain that in most models, including the aggregate figures, this variable is 
statistically significant. 
 
                                                 
14
 Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the execution of projects of this nature also generates 
employment in the communities where the project is being implemented. In other words, the project 
itself requires a temporary labour force to be executed. Therefore, there is an additional incentive apart 
from that which has been planned as part of the project. 
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Table 5. Panel data estimations (Random effects) of spending allocation at FHIS 
 
 National Aggregate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Pooled Closed-list Open-list Pooled Open-list Closed-list 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Log of M -0.205** -0.250** -0.174 -0.175** -0.175** -0.147* 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
TB 0.346***   0.451***   
 (0.07)   (0.07)   
New 
government 
0.070 
(0.09) 
-0.105 
(0.30) 
2.703* 
(1.41) 
-0.141** 
(0.04) 
-0.190 
(0.13) 
-1.004*** 
(0.26) 
-0.046 0.191 -1.836** 0.056 0.181** 0.843*** Electoral 
year (0.05) (0.22) (0.89) (0.04) (0.09) (0.19) 
0.259*** -0.549 -11.348** 0.378*** -0.579*** 3.974*** Party in 
government (0.05) (0.62) (5.69) (0.04) (0.17) (1.10) 
Stronghold 0.070 0.056 0.042 0.021 0.031 0.009 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Lost  0.134** 0.172* 0.079 0.008 0.017 -0.013 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
Opposition -0.047 -0.053 -0.017 -0.005 0.004 0.013 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
0.083* 0.085 0.130** 0.009 0.028 0.029 Government 
mayors (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Turnout -0.006** -0.013** -0.003 -0.004** -0.010*** -0.004** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Mitch -0.075 -0.100 0.000 0.487*** 0.613*** 0.000 
 (0.31) (0.40) (0.00) (0.06) (0.14) (0.00) 
0.112** 0.046 0.069 0.169*** 0.115** 0.105** Lagged dep. 
variable (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
-1.649** -0.156 -3.156*** -0.334 0.554 -1.391** Log of Gini 
coeff. (0.65) (0.88) (0.80) (0.39) (0.51) (0.49) 
Log of GDP -1.978*** -27.872 75.242** -1.558*** -28.772*** -25.085*** 
 (0.49) (18.81) (37.88) (0.39) (4.15) (7.43) 
-0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** 0.000 Income pc 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Urban index -0.005 0.003 0.002 -0.019 0.005 -0.042** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
0.218** 0.303** 0.134 0.309*** 0.233*** 0.368*** % population 
(0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) 
0.209 0.209 0.093 0.498*** 0.078 0.990*** % extreme 
poverty (0.24) (0.30) (0.35) (0.14) (0.21) (0.19) 
Schools -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 10.746*** 139.955 -373.675** 8.999*** 144.386*** 125.852*** 
 (2.29) (93.16) (188.37) (1.87) (20.57) (36.94) 
N 859 390 469 1947 889 1058 
R2 0.24 0.41 0.16 0.28             0.45             0.20 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. R-squared from OLS estimates. * significant at 0.1 
**significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
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Robustness analysis 
 
 
I first conduct an analysis of political variables only. The results of this test of 
robustness are shown in Table 6. As it can be observed, both, TB and the log of M are 
statistically significant for projects funded with national sources and the aggregate 
figures. The negative sign of the parameters of M in all models suggests that an 
increase in the number of seats per constituency decreases spending, even under the 
open-list PR electoral system. It is interesting to note that both, in terms of the 
aggregate figures, i.e. funding that comes from international and national sources, 
spending tends to be sensitive to political cycles, as the variables of ‘party in 
government’, ‘new government’ and ‘electoral year’ show, contrary to the 
expectations. Whether spending goes to the government’s strongholds, the opposition 
or to swing voters is not very significant in the aggregate figures. Whilst in the 
national ones the results suggest that the party that is holding office tends to benefit 
those constituencies that were lost in the last election. The negative sign in 
‘Strongholds’ and ‘Opposition’ in models 7 to 9 might be an indication that 
municipalities of the opposition tend to receive less spending whereas government’s 
strongholds are more likely to receive more spending. Interestingly, ‘government’s 
mayors’ is only significant under the closed-list electoral system, contrary to the 
results shown in Table 5 above. 
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Table 6. Panel data estimations (Random effects) of allocation of spending at FHIS, 
political variables only  
 
 
 National Aggregate 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Pooled Closed-list Open-list Pooled Closed-list Open-list 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Log of M -0.330*** -0.360** -0.313** -0.357*** -0.300*** -0.369*** 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) 
TB 0.105**   0.101**   
 (0.05)   (0.03)   
-0.094 -0.015 0.046 0.210*** 0.364*** -0.108** New 
government (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
0.004 -0.174** -0.043 0.153*** -0.415*** 0.276*** Electoral 
year (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) 
0.108** 0.325*** -0.121** 0.301*** 0.648*** 0.269*** Party in 
government (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
Stronghold 0.077 0.113 0.049 0.068 0.085 0.068 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
Lost 0.197*** 0.261** 0.159** 0.073* 0.068 0.083* 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
Opposition -0.072 -0.059 -0.064 0.024 0.033 0.002 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
0.068 0.153** 0.039 0.031 0.046 0.053 Government 
mayor (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Turnout -0.016*** -0.026*** -0.008** -0.010*** -0.017*** -0.008*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 1.930*** 2.001*** 1.893*** 1.950*** 1.733*** 1.982*** 
 (0.13) (0.21) (0.15) (0.08) (0.13) (0.11) 
N 1143 452 691 2147 916 1231 
R2 0.12 0.31 0.07 0.12 0.36 0.07 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. R-squared from OLS estimates. * significant at 0.1 
**significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
 
Due to the fact that random effects models assume that the variation within variables 
is part of the error term, I run fixed-effects models to check whether there is time 
correlation within regressors.  As I previously mentioned, fixed-effects models cannot 
estimate the effect of time-constant regressors. Thus, variables that do not change 
over time, such as district magnitude have not been included in the model. Due to 
potential autocorrelation between variables ‘Stronghold’ and ‘Opposition’ I report two 
different sets of results in Table 7 and Table 8, one using only Stronghold and the 
other using Opposition.  As observed, a change in the type of ballot is still significant 
in pooled models. Similar to Model 3 presented in Table 5, Model 15 is statistically 
significant at the 5% level and substantially significant. The similarity with model 3 
indicates that this variable is auto-correlated under the open-list system but not in the 
closed-list system. Again, this might be an indication that the change of type of ballot 
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affects the dynamics in which spending is allocated under two different parties in 
government. 
 
It also can be noticed that when only funding that comes from national sources is 
considered the electoral strongholds of the opposition are more likely to get less 
spending. This result is statistically significant in the pooled model (column 13), and 
it does not seem to have a similar effect when international sources of funding are 
involved. The opposite happens when the electoral strongholds are those of the party 
in government. As it is presented in Table 8, column 19, the government’s 
strongholds are more likely to receive more spending. This might be interpreted as a 
confirmation of Cox and McCubbins’ (1986) model. However, at the time writing 
more statistical analysis with data disaggregated by months and during electoral years 
is being conducted. It is expected that the results differ during ordinary years. In 
general, it is observed that those municipalities lost by the party in government during 
the immediate last election have greater chances to receive funding from national 
sources.  
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Table 7. Panel data estimations (Fixed effects) of allocation of spending at FHIS 
 
 National Aggregate 
 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
 Pooled Closed-list Open-list Pooled Closed-list Open-list 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
TB 0.389***   0.493***   
 (0.08)   (0.07)   
-0.001 0.226 3.518** -0.120** -0.247* -1.030*** New 
government (0.10) (0.34) (1.38) (0.05) (0.14) (0.26) 
-0.105* -0.155 -2.400** 0.025 0.106 0.880*** Electoral 
year (0.05) (0.24) (0.87) (0.04) (0.10) (0.19) 
0.287*** 0.116 -14.750** 0.373*** -0.613*** 4.244*** Party in 
government (0.05) (0.67) (5.58) (0.04) (0.18) (1.12) 
Lost 0.223** 0.262* 0.220* 0.021 0.262** -0.010 
 (0.07) (0.15) (0.12) (0.05) (0.11) (0.07) 
Opposition -0.204** -0.206 -0.116 0.004 -0.084 0.059 
 (0.09) (0.17) (0.15) (0.06) (0.13) (0.09) 
0.079 0.119 0.188* 0.018 0.117 0.067 Government 
mayor (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) 
Turnout -0.007 -0.018* -0.012 -0.001 -0.015 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Mitch -0.038 -0.848* . 0.463*** 0.679*** . 
 (0.40) (0.48) . (0.06) (0.15) . 
0.117** -0.056 0.015 0.174*** 0.102** 0.117** Lagged dep. 
variable (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Log of GDP -3.081*** -10.630 97.509** -1.801*** -28.032*** -27.595*** 
 (0.59) (20.31) (37.11) (0.43) (4.39) (7.53) 
Income pc 0.000** -0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 15.485*** 54.161 -483.876** 10.159*** 140.645*** 138.312*** 
 (2.76) (100.56) (184.71) (2.06) (21.79) (37.53) 
N 859 390 469 1947 889 1058 
R2 0.12 0.34 0.12 0.20 0.47 0.08 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.1 **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 
0.01. 
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Table 8. Panel data estimations (Fixed effects) of allocation of spending at FHIS 
 
 National Aggregate 
 (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
 Pooled Closed-list Open-list Pooled Closed-list Open-list 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
TB 0.389***   0.493***   
 (0.08)   (0.07)   
-0.001 0.226 3.518** -0.120** -0.247* -1.030*** New 
government (0.10) (0.34) (1.38) (0.05) (0.14) (0.26) 
-0.105* -0.155 -2.400** 0.025 0.106 0.880*** Electoral 
year (0.05) (0.24) (0.87) (0.04) (0.10) (0.19) 
0.287*** 0.116 -14.750** 0.373*** -0.613*** 4.244*** Party in 
government (0.05) (0.67) (5.58) (0.04) (0.18) (1.12) 
Lost 0.223** 0.262* 0.220* 0.021 0.262** -0.010 
 (0.07) (0.15) (0.12) (0.05) (0.11) (0.07) 
Stronghold 0.204** 0.206 0.116 -0.004 0.084 -0.059 
 (0.09) (0.17) (0.15) (0.06) (0.13) (0.09) 
0.079 0.119 0.188* 0.018 0.117 0.067 Government 
mayor (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) 
Turnout -0.007 -0.018* -0.012 -0.001 -0.015 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Mitch -0.038 -0.848* . 0.463*** 0.679*** . 
 (0.40) (0.48) . (0.06) (0.15) . 
0.117** -0.056 0.015 0.174*** 0.102** 0.117** Lagged dep. 
variable (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Log of GDP -3.081*** -10.630 97.509** -1.801*** -28.032*** -27.595*** 
 (0.59) (20.31) (37.11) (0.43) (4.39) (7.53) 
Income pc 0.000** -0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 15.406*** 54.079 -483.919** 10.161*** 140.612*** 138.334*** 
 (2.76) (100.56) (184.71) (2.06) (21.78) (37.53) 
N 859 390 469 1947 889 1058 
R2 0.12 0.34 0.12 0.20 0.47 0.08 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.1 **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 
0.01. 
 
To control for the influence of outliers I run statistical tests for observations between 
1999 and 2009. As previously mentioned, spending with national sources tends to 
follow a more stable pattern after 1998. For this analysis I present results for random 
effects models; these are presented in Table 9. It can be observed that in comparison 
to the main models introduced in Table 5, there are not important changes. Overall, 
the tendencies are quite similar, which suggest the robustness of the models.  
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Table 9. Panel data estimations (Random effects) of allocation of spending at FHIS, 
political variables only, for years between 1999 and 2009 
 
 National Aggregate 
 (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
 Pooled Closed-list Open-list Pooled Closed-list Open-list 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Log of M -0.203** -0.246** -0.174 -0.187** -0.202** -0.147* 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) 
TB 0.345***   0.446***   
 (0.07)   (0.07)   
New 
government 
0.069 -0.108 2.703* -0.141** -0.162 -1.004*** 
 (0.09) (0.30) (1.41) (0.04) (0.13) (0.26) 
Electoral 
year 
-0.046 0.197 -1.836** 0.056 0.177* 0.843*** 
 (0.05) (0.22) (0.89) (0.04) (0.09) (0.19) 
Party in 
government 
0.257*** -0.566 -11.348** 0.375*** -0.578*** 3.974*** 
 (0.05) (0.62) (5.69) (0.04) (0.17) (1.10) 
Stronghold 0.066 0.044 0.042 0.027 0.051 0.009 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
Lost 0.132** 0.167* 0.079 0.027 0.077 -0.013 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) 
Opposition -0.046 -0.052 -0.017 -0.013 -0.015 0.013 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) 
Government 
mayor 
0.083* 0.084 0.130** 0.007 0.029 0.029 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Turnout -0.007** -0.013** -0.003 -0.005** -0.013*** -0.004** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Lagged dep. 
variable 
0.114** 0.049 0.069 0.173*** 0.104** 0.105** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Log of Gini 
coeff. 
-1.651** -0.153 -3.156*** -0.417 0.744 -1.391** 
 (0.65) (0.90) (0.80) (0.43) (0.61) (0.49) 
Log of GDP -1.963*** -28.245 75.242** -1.582*** -28.771*** -25.085*** 
 (0.49) (18.78) (37.88) (0.39) (4.24) (7.43) 
Income pc -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Urban index -0.003 0.008 0.002 -0.023 0.007 -0.042** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
% of 
population 
0.214** 0.295** 0.134 0.325*** 0.246** 0.368*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) 
% extreme 
poverty 
0.221 0.216 0.093 0.682*** 0.390* 0.990*** 
 (0.24) (0.30) (0.35) (0.16) (0.23) (0.19) 
Schools -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 10.669*** 141.812 -373.675** 9.029*** 144.390*** 125.852*** 
 (2.29) (93.01) (188.37) (1.89) (21.01) (36.94) 
N 855 386 469 1686 628 1058 
R2       
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.1 **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 
0.01. 
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Conclusions 
 
Most of the results that have been presented in this working paper are not statistically 
substantive. However, the study presents evidence that suggests that the electoral 
reform that took place in 2004, changing the type of ballot from a closed-list system 
to an open-list system has lead to an increase in social spending per capita. Yet, the 
findings indicate that the interaction between type of ballot and district magnitude 
does not cause the effect that the theory predicts in the open-list electoral system. 
District magnitude is significant in most of the statistical tests conducted; 
nevertheless, changes in type of ballot do not modify the direction in which spending 
is allocated. In other words, a municipality will be more likely to receive social 
spending from FHIS the smaller the district magnitude of the constituency it belongs, 
regardless of the type of ballot. However, an analysis of the interaction effect of party 
in office and type of ballot reveals statistical and substantive changes that require 
further exploration at a different level of aggregation of the data.  
 
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that spending tends to be allocated to government 
strongholds, while electoral strongholds of the opposition receive less funding from 
the government as proposed by Cox and McCubbins (1986). The results are 
statistically significant only in fixed-effects models though. This evidence is 
supported by the finding that if a municipality mayor comes from the same party in 
government, its local government is more likely to receive funding. In addition, those 
municipalities where the government lost the last presidential election are also prone 
to receive funding; the results are significant for ‘National’ models. I interpret this 
result as an indication that the party in government tends to benefit swing voters, 
which are the bulk during the period studied, and they might decide the final electoral 
outcome. 
 
Voters’ turnout is statistically significant at the one percent level in most of the 
models, although its effects on the log of spending are not substantial. As I mentioned 
previously, the negative sign of its coefficients in all models is an indication that 
poverty and abstentionism are inversely correlated, which means that the poor tend to 
vote more in Honduras and they also receive more spending. Since by nature FHIS is 
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an institution that should work for the poor, this evidence cannot be used to support 
the theory that spending at FHIS is used with clientelistic purposes. The effects of this 
parameter are even stronger in models where international aid is involved. Its negative 
sign suggests that spending tends to be allocated in municipalities where voters tend 
to attend in higher proportions to the ballot boxes. The interpretation of this result 
needs a bit of discussion. As explained above, interestingly, in Honduras the level of 
electoral abstentionism is lower amongst poor voters. Some interpret this behaviour as 
a sign of clientelism in Honduras; in other words, politicians tend to benefit through 
pork-barrel and other clientelistic practices poorer regions in order to gain votes in the 
next election (Taylor-Robinson 2010, Coleman, Argueta et al. 2009, Cruz, Argueta et 
al. 2007).15 Thus, voters’ turnout and poverty might be inversely correlated. That 
would explain that in most models, including the aggregate figures, this variable is 
statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the execution of projects of this nature also generates 
employment in the communities where the project is being implemented. In other words, the project 
itself requires a temporary labour force to be executed. Therefore, there is an additional incentive apart 
from that which has been planned as part of the project. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure 5. Spending per capita at FHIS, per year, funded with national and 
international sources 
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Figure 6. GDP and Government revenues at constant prices lempiras (year base 
= 1999) 
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